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This paper examines the impact of capital market integration (CMI) on higher education and 
economic growth. We take into account that participation in higher education is non-
compulsory and depends on individual choice. Integration increases (decreases) the incentives 
to participate in higher education in capital-importing (-exporting) economies, all other things 
equal. Increased participation in higher education enhances productivity progress and is 
accompanied by rising wage inequality. From a national policy point of view, education 
expenditure should increase after integration of similar economies. Using foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as a measure for capital flows, we present empirical evidence which largely 
confirms our main hypothesis: An increase in net capital inflows in response to CMI raises 
participation in higher education and thereby fosters economic growth. We apply a structural 
estimation approach to fully track the endogenous mechanisms of the model. 
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Capital markets have become increasingly integrated in the last decades. For instance,
the average annual growth rate of foreign direct investment (FDI) inﬂows in the world
has been about 25 percent in the period 1986-90, 20 percent in 1991-95 and almost
32 percent in 1996-99 (Markusen, 2002, Tab. 1.1).1 Unsurprisingly in light of such
evidence, a large literature on the consequences of increased capital mobility has de-
veloped.
This paper contributes to this literature by linking capital market integration (CMI)
to higher education and growth. Examining the link between CMI and higher education
is motivated by two facts. First, participation in higher education is non-compulsory
and depends on individual educational choice. Second, there is strong empirical sup-
port for the hypothesis that physical and human capital are strongly complementary
production factors (Goldin and Katz, 1998, Krusell, Ohanian, R´ ıos-Rull and Violante,
2000). We argue that, therefore, capital inﬂows increase individual incentives to acquire
higher education by raising the relative marginal productivity of skilled to low-skilled
labor. In turn, the supply of skilled labor is an important determinant of capital
allocation (UNCTAD, 1996, 2002).2 The link to economic growth is motivated by
the literature on the positive role of human capital formation for productivity progress
(see Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2004, for recent evidence). Taken
together, capital-skill complementarity and non-compulsory higher education as deter-
minant of productivity growth suggest the following hypothesis we attempt to advance
in this paper. CMI increases the incentives to participate in higher education and
raises both educational attainment and economic growth in countries which experience
a (net) inﬂow of capital after integration, all other things being equal. By contrast, the
share of skilled labor and therefore growth is reduced in economies in which integration
causes a capital outﬂow. This suggests that the impact of CMI on economic growth
1In these three time periods, FDI stocks have grown on average by 18.2 percent, 9.4 percent and
16.2 percent, respectively. Moreover, the measure on international investment barriers, which we use
to instrument capital ﬂows in our empirical analysis, has declined dramatically over the last decades.
2In particular, tertiary education is found to be “an inducement for FDI” (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 36).
2through increased participation in higher education depends on the initial conditions
which aﬀect the marginal productivity of capital and the pattern of capital ﬂows.3 By
using data for the period 1960-2000 from 87 countries, we present empirical evidence
which largely supports the main hypothesis derived from our theoretical model: All
other things being equal, an increase in net capital inﬂows in response to CMI raises
participation in higher education and thereby promotes economic growth.4
While participation in higher education is determined by individual choice, the
output of schooling also depends on the amount of ﬁnancial resources invested into the
education system. The bulk of educational spending in secondary education and in
many countries, Continental Europe for instance, also in tertiary education, typically
comes from the public sector. This points to a prominent role of public education policy
under integrated international capital markets. Therefore, we address the question
how governments should react to changes in the demand for education caused by CMI.
According to our analysis, public education expenditure (ﬁnanced by a wage tax)
raises the share of skilled labor in an integrated economy primarily through attracting
foreign capital investment. This implies, from a national point of view, that education
expenditure of an economy should be increased after integration with similar economies.
Moreover, our analysis suggests that, under optimal adjustment of education policy,
educational attainment typically rises after CMI. However, this is not generally true. If
unfavorable initial conditions induce large capital outﬂows after integration, it may not
be optimal to raise education expenditure to a point which fully oﬀsets the negative
eﬀect of CMI on the individual incentives to participate in higher education.
3For instance, as argued by Lucas (1990), capital may ﬂow from capital-poor to capital-rich
economies when the latter have signiﬁcantly higher stocks of initial human capital and higher to-
tal factor productivity.
4Our empirical analysis uses FDI as measure of capital ﬂows. In line with our ﬁndings, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that FDI inﬂows typically have signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on economic growth
(Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek, 2004; Khawar, 2005). According to our analysis, these
positive eﬀects come from the impact of investment ﬂows on human capital formation. In their sem-
inal contribution on capital mobility and growth, Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) present a
neoclassical growth model with two capital goods and an international credit market. They show that,
when only one of the two cumulated goods can serve as collateral for borrowing on the world market
(capturing partial mobility of capital), the model can account for observed patterns of convergence of
per capita income growth rates. Smulders (2004) considers the role of capital mobility on convergence
in a framework with monopolistic competition and R&D-based growth.
3This analysis is related to the literature on the link between education policy and
capital mobility. Gradstein and Justman (1995) and Viaene and Zilcha (2002a) argue
that CMI typically gives rise to overprovision of public education in a policy game
among two identical countries, calling for policy coordination. Our results suggest a
similar conclusion. However, we do not analyze the non-cooperative policy game or op-
timal education policy from an integrated point of view. Viaene and Zilcha (2002b), in a
model with compulsory education, show that CMI raises income inequality in capital-
importing economies, whereas the opposite happens in capital-exporting economies.
Although inequality is not the central focus of our paper, our analysis produces an
analogous result. The eﬀect of CMI on inequality in our model is due to the assump-
tion of heterogeneity of individuals in learning abilities, which gives rise to a positive
relationship between the share of skilled labor and inequality of wage income.
Our goal is to derive empirically testable hypotheses on the relationship between
international capital ﬂows, participation in higher education and economic growth,
taking into account possible adjustments of public education policy. As outlined above,
for a given level of public education expenditures, educational attainment increases
if CMI leads to a capital inﬂow, but decreases if it leads to an outﬂow. If public
education expenditures are optimally adjusted, educational attainment increases even
in the case of capital outﬂows, unless the outﬂows are large. The impact of CMI on
growth comes from the positive impact of participation in higher education on total
factor productivity. We provide an empirical assessment of the main hypotheses in
an econometric modelling approach that follows the causal channels identiﬁed in the
theoretical analysis as closely as possible. Instrumental variable and system regressions
are applied to test for these channels. The empirical results conﬁrm our theoretical
prediction that capital inﬂows stimulate participation in higher education and thereby
promote economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic (static) version
of the model. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium for a given public education policy.
Section 4 examines optimal education policy. Section 5 extends the basic model to
4a simple overlapping generations setting, to investigate the relationship between CMI
and economic growth through eﬀects on educational attainment. Section 6 presents
empirical evidence on the main hypotheses derived from the theoretical analysis. The
last section brieﬂy summarizes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Basic Model
Consider ﬁrst a static economy with a single homogeneous consumption good supplied
under perfect competition. Output Y is produced according to the following constant-
returns to scale technology:
Y = F(K,S,L) = A

bK




b,β ∈ (0,1), where total factor productivity (TFP) A > 0 indicates the technological
state of the economy (endogenized in section 5), K is physical capital input, and S
and L are eﬃciency units of skilled and low-skilled labor, respectively. Note that
(1) implies that physical capital and skilled labor are technological complements, in
contrast to capital and low-skilled labor. As will become apparent, this capital-skill
complementarity is crucial for our results (see Remark 2 below). It is well-supported
by empirical evidence (see, e.g., Goldin and Katz, 1998).
There are two classes of individuals. Capitalists, who don’t work, and a unit mass
of workers, indexed i ∈ [0,1], who don’t own capital. They choose whether or not to
acquire higher education.
Preferences of worker i are represented by the utility function
U(i) = lnl(i) + lnC(i), (2)
where C(i) is i’s consumption level, l(i) = 1 if i remains low-skilled and l(i) = 1−e(i)
if i is skilled.5 e(i) may be interpreted as eﬀort cost of acquiring education in terms
5Capitalists simply maximize their income.
5of foregone leisure, l(i). Assuming that eﬀort costs are individual-speciﬁc captures
heterogeneity of workers with respect to learning (or cognitive) ability. For simplicity,
suppose e is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
As has been stressed in the literature, governments may adjust education policy
to CMI (e.g., Gradstein and Justman, 1995). Hence, in order to derive testable hy-
potheses for the eﬀect of CMI on educational attainment, one has to examine how
education policy aﬀects the relationship between integration and educational choice.
We assume that the skill level of an educated worker positively depends on public ed-
ucation spending.6 More precisely, let G be the level of public education expenditure
and denote by s = 1 − L the mass (“number”) of workers participating in education,
i.e., per capita spending equals G/s. Then an individual choosing education acquires
G/s units of skilled labor. When s individuals acquire education − each obtaining
G/s eﬃciency units of skilled labor − total eﬃciency units of skilled labor are given
by S = G. Thus, according to (1), G > 0 is necessary for the economy to be viable. If
an individual remains low-skilled, (s)he is endowed with one unit of low-skilled labor.
Workers inelastically supply their eﬃciency units of labor and all factor markets are
perfect.
Remark 1. We could be more general in assuming that an educated worker obtains
skill level Gθ/sα, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, θ ≤ 1. Consequently, S = s1−αGθ. This education
technology allows for the two extreme cases of education being a pure public good
(α = 0) or fully rival (α = 1), as well as for intermediate cases. Moreover, θ < 1
implies that the marginal productivity of public education spending, G, is decreasing.
We checked that, qualitatively, our results on educational attainment remain unaﬀected
when allowing for α < 1 and θ < 1. To keep the analysis simple we focus on the case
where public education is a fully rival good and the marginal productivity of G is
6A standard justiﬁcation for public ﬁnance of education is the incapability of individuals to borrow
for educational purposes. In most advanced countries, the bulk of secondary education is indeed
ﬁnanced by the public sector. In Continental Europe, for instance, this is true even for tertiary
education. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) showed that a public education system arises under majority
voting for plausible assumptions on the income distribution. See Gradstein, Justman and Meier (2005)
for an excellent review of the literature on political economy models of public education. Our main
insights would be unchanged, however, if we allowed for private education investments as well.
6constant.
Education is ﬁnanced by a proportional tax on wage income, with tax rate τ ∈ (0,1).
Public education expenditure is given by
G = τ (wSS + wLL), (3)
where wS and wL denote the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of skilled and low-skilled
labor, respectively.
In order to determine the eﬀects of CMI, we examine a switch from autarky, with
domestic capital stock ¯ K, to a small open economy, facing interest rate ¯ r. In the open
economy, the consumption good is tradable, capital is mobile and labor is immobile.
3 Equilibrium Analysis





WS ≡ (1 − τ)wSG/s if skilled,
WL ≡ (1 − τ)wL if low-skilled.
(4)
Denote by ω = wS/wL the relative wage rate (per eﬃciency unit) of skilled to
low-skilled labor. According to (2) and (4), an individual becomes skilled if and only
if
e(i) ≤ 1 −
s
ωG
≡ ˆ e(s,ω,G), (5)
i.e., the eﬀort cost of education is below some threshold ability level, ˆ e.7 As e is
uniformly distributed on [0,1], this implies that the share of skilled workers, s, is given
7Instead of assuming that education costs are in terms of foregone leisure, we could alternatively
assume that they are in terms of foregone wages as a low-skilled worker, without aﬀecting our analysis.
To see this, suppose that utility is given by some increasing function of consumption only. The
consumption level is given by (1−e(i))WS for a skilled individual with learning time e(i) − the time
in which this worker cannot work as low-skilled − and WL for a low-skilled worker. Hence, individual
i aquires education if and only if (1 − e(i))WS ≥ WL, which gives rise to the inequality in (5).





Thus, s is increasing in both ω (which is endogenous) and G. Throughout the paper,
relative disposable income, WS/WL, is taken as measure for the dispersion of labor







Any increase in the share of skilled workers is associated with higher inequality of
labor earnings. This is an implication of the fact that the marginal entrant into the
higher education system has eﬀort cost ˆ e = s. Thus, if more individuals choose higher
education, the compensation for becoming skilled must have increased.
Denote by r the rental rate of capital. According to (1), factor prices are given by
r = Aβb(S/K)
1−β , (8)
wS = A(1 − β)

bK




wL = Aβ(1 − b)(S/L)
1−β. (10)
Using S = G and L = 1 − s we get from (9) and (10)
ω =
1 − β
β (1 − b)
bKβ(1 − s)1−β + (1 − b)(1 − s)
G
. (11)
After substitution of (6) for ω in (11) the following relationship between capital





2−β + (1 − b)(1 − s)
2
− β (1 − b)s = 0. (12)
8Equation (12) gives us s as increasing function of capital stock K; we write s = s(K).8
This relationship reﬂects the capital-skill complementarity embodied in (1): If K rises,
the relative marginal productivity of skilled labor (ω) increases; hence, there is a higher
incentive to acquire education. In the autarky case, K = ¯ K is exogenous and the share
of skilled workers (denoted sAUT) is given by sAUT = s( ¯ K). Moreover, with S = G and
K = ¯ K, condition (8) implies that the interest rate, rAUT, is given by the function




This again reﬂects the capital-skill complementarity. rAUT increases in public educa-
tion expenditure G, because each skilled worker becomes more productive when G is
raised. Moreover, not surprisingly, rAUT is increasing in TFP, A, and, due to decreasing
marginal productivity of capital, decreasing in ¯ K.
In a small open economy, the capital stock, KSOE, is endogenously determined
while the rental rate of capital ¯ r is given by the world market. Using S = G in (8), we
obtain KSOE = ξG, where
ξ = ξ(A, ¯ r) = [Aβb/¯ r]
1
1−β . (14)
Thus, KSOE is increasing in TFP, A, and education expenditure, G, whereas it is
decreasing in the rental rate of capital, ¯ r. The share of skilled workers in a small open
economy is given by sSOE = s(KSOE) = s(ξ(A, ¯ r)G) ≡ sSOE(A, ¯ r,G).
According to (12), sSOE > (=,<)sAUT if KSOE > (=,<) ¯ K, which is equivalent
to ¯ r < (=,>)rAUT. Due to capital-skill complementarity, the share of skilled workers
under openness is higher than under autarky if and only if additional foreign capital
can be attracted. This is the case if the world market rental rate of capital is lower
than the domestic autarky interest rate. We therefore have the following impact of
CMI (switch from autarky to capital mobility) on educational choice.
8s(K) exists and is unique, as the left-hand side of (12) is positive for s = 0, negative for s = 1,
and strictly decreasing in s.
9Proposition 1. Capital market integration raises (does not aﬀect, reduces) the
share of skilled workers if ¯ r < rAUT(A, ¯ K,G) ( ¯ r =,> rAUT(A, ¯ K,G), respectively).
Capital-skill complementarity in the production technology gives rise to an inter-
esting interaction between international capital markets, skill formation and the distri-
bution of wage income in the economy. Proposition 1 suggests that CMI is beneﬁcial
(harmful) for participation in higher education in countries with a high (low) produc-
tivity of capital. (In section 5 we examine the implications of this result for growth.)
With respect to equality, the opposite holds true, since CMI simultaneously aﬀects
wage income dispersion in the same direction as educational attainment, according to
(7).9 For a given stock of domestic capital, the condition for an increase in schooling
and inequality is that a country’s total factor productivity or its education spending
are relatively high so that the marginal eﬃciency of capital lies above the world level.
If the rental rate of capital required by the world market is below the autarky rate,
capital demand increases and thus the relative productivity of skilled labor rises. This
enhances the incentives to acquire education. In contrast, if educational spending or
TFP is comparably low, both skill formation and inequality may be reduced by open-
ing up to international capital markets, even if the domestic capital stock is low. The
mechanism for this result is consistent with the fact that capital does not necessarily
ﬂow from advanced to less developed countries (e.g., Lucas, 1990), as less developed
economies are typically not only characterized by a low physical capital stock but also
by both a low human capital stock and low productivity. Thus, there may be an out-
ﬂow of capital from these countries after integration. Our analysis suggests that this
triggers an adverse eﬀect on skill formation.
In the open economy, domestic capital input has to be ﬁnanced at the cost required
by the international capital market, ¯ r. These cost include possible premia for business
risk and impediments to investment in the country. (In the empirical analysis we use
data from the Business Environment Risk Intelligence to account for these cost.) The
following proposition shows how variations in international capital cost aﬀect participa-
9Galor and Moav (2000) derive a similar eﬀect from technological change instead of CMI.
10tion in higher education when the economy has opened up. Moreover, the proposition
shows that opening up to the international capital market has consequences for the
impact of education spending and factor productivity on skill formation.
Proposition 2. sSOE rises with declining international capital cost ( ¯ r). Moreover,
an increase in education expenditure (G) or in TFP (A) has no eﬀect on sAUT, but
raises sSOE.
In view of the positive relationship between earnings inequality (WS/WL) and the
share of skilled workers, described by (7), Proposition 2 immediately implies that an
increase in G or A raises WS/WL in an open economy but not under autarky. Under
autarky, higher public spending on education, G, has two counteracting eﬀects on
education decisions. On the one hand, it raises eﬃciency units per skilled worker and
thereby increases the incentives to acquire education, all other things equal. On the
other hand, however, the relative wage rate ω declines for given educational choices,
according to (11). This second eﬀect exactly oﬀsets the ﬁrst eﬀect. Thus, educational
decisions in autarky do not depend on G. As the distribution of earnings can only
change along with the share of skilled workers, s, also inequality is unaﬀected. In an
open economy, there is an additional eﬀect, which gives rise to the positive impact
of an increase in G on both the share of skilled workers and earnings inequality. An
increase in G, by raising aggregate skill level S, attracts capital to the economy. This
raises the productivity of skilled labor and its relative wage so that the incentives to
become skilled are higher than under autarky. These results will play an important
role for the normative implications of CMI, analyzed in the next section.
A higher level of TFP, A, has similar eﬀects as an increase in G. Under autarky,
by raising marginal products of skilled and unskilled labor equally, an increase in A
neither aﬀects educational decisions nor inequality. With integrated capital markets,
an increase in A induces capital inﬂow which makes education more attractive. The
model suggests that, under international mobility of capital, technologically advanced
countries have both higher educational attainment and higher inequality of wage income
11than less advanced countries, all other things equal.10 (In section 5, we will allow for
a feedback eﬀect from participation in higher education to productivity growth, which
enables us to study the relationship between CMI and growth in the model.)
Remark 2. The shown eﬀects under capital-skill complementarity (exhibited by
production technology (1)) on educational choice are considerably diﬀerent to those
implied by, say, a CES-production function:
F(K,S,L) = A[aKK
ρ + aSS




aK,aS > 0, aK + aS < 1, ρ < 1. To see this, note that (15) implies for the relative
wage rate ω = (aS/[1 − aK − aS])(L/S)1−ρ. After substitution of S = G, L = 1 − s
and (6), the share of unskilled workers is given by (1 − aK − aS)s = aSGρ(1 − s)2−ρ in
a closed as well as in an open economy. Hence, under (15), s neither depends on A nor
on capital market variables ( ¯ K or ¯ r, respectively). International integration plays no
role. A change in G has an ambiguous eﬀect on s (and no eﬀect in the Cobb-Douglas
case, ρ → 0).
The results derived in the preceding positive analysis point to an important policy
issue. Suppose an economy chooses an “optimal” education spending level (according
to some objective function) in autarky, GAUT. How should the economy adjust ed-
ucation expenditure to CMI? Moreover, will the share of skilled workers increase or
decrease under optimal policy adjustment when capital becomes internationally mo-
bile? Answering the latter question is of particular importance for an empirical test
of our theory, presented in section 6. If governments adjust their education policy to
CMI, one has to account for the endogeneity of public education expenditures.
10Krusell, Ohanian, R´ ıos-Rull and Violante (2000) propose an explanation of the apparent rise in
wage dispersion in the US in the 1980s and 1990s which is consistent with our analysis. They show
empirically that higher investment in physical capital in the U.S. can explain the evolution of wage
inequality and they emphasize the role of capital-skill complementarity, when discussing the economic
intuition behind their ﬁndings.
124 Optimal Education Policy
To characterize the optimal education policy, conditional on the capital market regime
(open or closed), we ﬁrst have to specify the policy objective. We employ a Rawlsian
welfare function. That is, education policy is optimal when utility of the low-skilled,
lnWL, is maximized. (Remark 3 below shows that results would qualitatively be un-
changed under a utilitarian welfare function.) Using (3), the net wage of the low-skilled,
WL = (1−τ)wL, can be written as WL = wL−G/(ωS +L). After substituting S = G,
(6), (10) and L = 1 − s, and rearranging terms, the expression for WL reads







1 − s + s2 ≡ V (A,s,G). (16)
Optimal education spending under autarky, denoted by GAUT, is given by GAUT(A, ¯ K) =
argmaxG≥0 V (A,s( ¯ K),G). It is easy to see that there exists an interior and unique
solution for GAUT, with the following property.
Proposition 3. GAUT is increasing in A.
Under autarky, technologically advanced economies should spend more on education
than technologically backward economies. This is because skilled and low-skilled labor
are complementary factors of production; when G (and thus S) increases, also wage
rate wL increases. According to (10), this increase is more pronounced if A is high.
Under openness, WL = V (A,sSOE (A, ¯ r,G),G) ≡ ˜ V (A, ¯ r,G). Welfare ˜ V (A, ¯ r,G)
may be ever increasing in public education expenditure G, due to the positive inter-
action between G and capital inﬂow in an open economy. That is, there may be no
interior solution for the optimal policy problem. However, the following can be shown.
Lemma 1. If A <
(¯ r/β)β
b(1−β)1−β ≡ ˆ A, ˜ V (A, ¯ r,G) has an interior and unique maximum.
Proposition 1 has shown, for given education expenditure G, how the impact of
CMI on the share of skilled labor, s, depends on the pattern of capital ﬂows. We now
turn to the question how s changes after CMI when public education expenditure is
13adjusted optimally to GSOE (A, ¯ r) ≡ argmaxG≥0 ˜ V (A, ¯ r,G). That is, we compare the
share of skilled labor s∗(A, ¯ r) ≡ sSOE(A, ¯ r,GSOE(A, ¯ r)) with the pre-integration level,
sAUT = s( ¯ K). Moreover, we explore in which direction optimal adjustment of public
education expenditure tends to go when we start from GAUT, the optimal education
policy under autarky. That is, we analyze whether GAUT < GSOE or GAUT > GSOE.
Suppose ﬁrst that the cost of capital to be paid in the integrated capital market
equals the autarky interest rate. That is, ¯ r = rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT(A, ¯ K)), and conse-
quently, KSOE = KAUT and sSOE = sAUT. The following proposition states that in
this case GAUT is too low under capital mobility.
Proposition 4. Suppose A < ˆ A and ¯ r = rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT). Then GSOE > GAUT.
Proposition 4 shows that even integration with identical other economies has severe
consequences for the competitive position of an economy. Our analysis suggests to
expand education expenditure after integration if the economy’s rental rate of capital
resembles the rate in the other economies.11 Before discussing this result, we consider
how the impact of CMI on s depends on the pattern of capital ﬂows when education
policy is adjusted optimally.
Proposition 5. Suppose A < ˆ A. If ¯ r ≤ rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT), then s∗(A, ¯ r) >
s( ¯ K). By contrast, if ¯ r > rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT), then s∗(A, ¯ r) <,=,> s( ¯ K) is possible.
Moreover, s∗ is increasing in A.
According to Proposition 4, if education spending was at its optimal level under
autarky and the return to capital before integration is at the level required by the
world market, education spending should increase when capital becomes internationally
mobile (GSOE > GAUT). This is because the economy can attract foreign capital by
raising G (as KSOE = ξG). In turn, this enhances incentives to acquire education
(recall s0(K) > 0). In sum, the share of skilled labor increases under optimal policy
11This may give rise to an ineﬃcient equilibrium in a non-cooperative game between governments,
like in Gradstein and Justman (1995) and Viaene and Zilcha (2002a). As our goal is to derive testable
hypotheses with respect to the eﬀects of CMI, we do not explore this issue further.
14adjustment, i.e., s∗ > sAUT. This result also holds when the autarky interest rate is
higher than the international capital cost (¯ r < rAUT). This is because, for ¯ r < rAUT,
according to Proposition 1, s rises after integration even if education policy remains
unchanged. In contrast, if ¯ r > rAUT, s decreases after integration when G is held
constant. According to Proposition 5, even if integration tends to raise the optimal G,
the adjustment should not necessarily be strong enough to oﬀset this negative eﬀect
on the demand for education. As a result, s may or may not remain below its autarky
level. The ﬁnal result in Proposition 5 implies that, under openness, the share of
skilled labor under optimal education policy should be higher when the economy is
more advanced technologically.
Remark 3. Our main results would be unchanged when a utilitarian rather than
a Rawlsian welfare function is employed. To see this, note that in view of (2), (4) and




0 [ln(1 − e(i)) + lnWS]di +
R 1
ˆ e lnWLdi, where ˆ e




U(i)di = lnWL +
Z ˆ e
0
[ln(1 − e(i)) − ln(1 − ˆ e)]di, (17)
where the second summand on the right-hand side of (17) is an increasing function
of ˆ e. In the autarky equilibrium, ˆ e = s( ¯ K). Thus, under autarky, Rawlsian welfare
(lnWL) and utilitarian welfare only diﬀer by a constant such that normative results
are the same. Under openness ˆ e = sSOE(A, ¯ r,G). Since sSOE(A, ¯ r,G) increases in
G (Proposition 2) there is an additional incentive for the social planner to invest in
education compared to Rawlsian welfare. This strengthens our result that CMI tends
to increase public education expenditures and participation in higher education.
Some further remarks are in order. With respect to an optimal adjustment of
education policy, only the case ¯ r = rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT) has been considered in Propo-
sition 4. For examining the optimal response of education policy in the case ¯ r 6=
12Note that
R 1
0 lnWL = lnWL, since WL does not depend on e(i).
15rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT) one should know how GSOE is aﬀected by changes in ¯ r. For instance,
if GSOE decreases in ¯ r, then the eﬀect underlying Proposition 4 is strengthened, so that
¯ r < rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT) would also imply GSOE > GAUT.
Table 1: Optimal education policy under openness ( 0.5 bA β === ). 
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0.05 0.02  0.449 
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However, numerical analysis reveals that the impact of a change in ¯ r on optimal
education expenditure can go in both directions. According to Tab. 1, if β = b =
A = 0.5, GSOE ﬁrst decreases but then increases with ¯ r. Thus, although CMI gives an
incentive for the public sector to increase G when there is no interest rate diﬀerential,
general results with respect to the optimal adjustment of G are diﬃcult to obtain.
(Tab. 1 also illustrates the role of the world market interest rate for s∗ as stated in
Proposition 5, showing that s∗ monotonically declines when ¯ r rises.)
The answer given in Proposition 5 on how s is expected to react under optimal
adjustment of G to integration, together with the prediction derived for a given edu-
cation policy (Propositions 1 and 2), will turn out very useful for deriving a testable
hypothesis for the relationship between capital market integration, education policy,
and participation in higher education in section 6, where we provide empirical evidence.
5 Capital Market Integration and Growth
This section extends the basic model to a simple growth framework in discrete time
t = 0,1,2,... in order to study the implications of CMI for growth. Suppose there are
overlapping generations with two-period lives. In the ﬁrst period of life, individuals
16live by their parents and decide whether or not to acquire education. In the second
period (adulthood), they consume and work full-time, again, inelastically supplying
their skills to a perfect labor market. An individual i born in t − 1 is endowed with
one unit of time in t − 1 and characterized by et−1(i), the time required to acquire
education. That is, lt−1(i) = 1−et−1(i) is leisure in the ﬁrst period of life. We assume
that the distribution of e is time-invariant and again uniform on [0,1]. Like in the basic
model, utility of member i of generation t−1 is given by Ut−1(i) = lnlt−1(i)+lnCt(i),
where Ct(i) is consumption as adult. Taxes are levied on individuals who are currently
working, where the government’s budget is balanced in each period. That is, workers
from generation t−1 (working in t) ﬁnance the education of individuals from generation
t. The production and education technology are the same as in the basic model. Thus,
St = Gt−1.
The key assumption in this section is that the TFP growth rate, gA
t+1 = At+1/At −
1, is an increasing and concave function of the share of skilled labor in t, st. This
formulation is a reduced-form for the positive eﬀects of human capital for growth which
have been suggested by the literature.13 In addition, we account for the possibility
that gA
t+1 depends on total eﬃciency units of skilled labor, St. Finally, to allow for
(conditional) convergence, we suppose that gA
t+1 is a decreasing function of the level of
TFP. Formally, gA
t+1 = ˜ g(st,St,At), where ˜ gs > 0, ˜ gss ≤ 0, ˜ gS ≥ 0 and ˜ gA < 0; A0 > 0
is given. For the sake of concreteness, we specify ˜ g(s,S,A) = (s/A)
γ Sε−δ, 0 < γ < 1,







t + (1 − δ)At ≡ f(st,St,At). (18)
Applying the equilibrium analysis of section 3, st = s( ¯ K) for all t under autarky
and st = sSOE(At, ¯ r,Gt−1) under capital mobility.15 Thus, under openness, growth
13That TFP growth positively depends on human capital measures is well-supported empirically
(and used in various theoretical frameworks; see, e.g., Galor and Moav, 2000, among others), be it
through externalities as suggested by Lucas (1988), through political institutions (Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2004) or through (R&D-driven) productivity improvements (Hojo,
2003).
14δ > 0 reﬂects depreciation of knowledge over time.
15Individuals base educational decisions in their ﬁrst period of life on publicly provided resources in
17fosters education by raising the level of TFP (Proposition 1) and, conversely, education
determines TFP growth, according to (18). The next result characterizes dynamic
properties of TFP which arise from these links.
Proposition 6. Let Gt−1 = G for all t. (i) Under autarky and, if β ≤ 1/2,
also under capital mobility, TFP converges to a unique level ¯ A = (Gε/δ)
1/γ ¯ s, where
¯ s = s( ¯ K) under autarky and ¯ s = sSOE( ¯ A, ¯ r,G) under capital mobility. (ii) If A0 < ¯ A,
then under autarky and, provided that β ≤ 1/2, also under capital mobility, the TFP
growth rate, gA
t+1, is strictly decreasing over time.
Table 1: Optimal education policy under openness ( 0.5 bA β === ). 
r   SOE G   * s  
0.02 0.06  0.584 
0.05 0.02  0.449 
0.08 0.02  0.426 
0.11 0.03  0.421 
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As shown in the proof of Proposition 6, under autarky and, for β ≤ 1/2, also under
capital mobility, TFP evolves as depicted in Fig. 1. To avoid uninteresting technical
this period (which also determine their eﬀective labor supply in the second period) and on the level
of TFP in the next period, which evolves according to (18).
18discussions, we focus on β ≤ 1/2 in the following.16
Suppose that Gt−1 = G for all t. Then from Proposition 6 it follows that under
autarky steady state TFP level, ¯ A, is increasing in G if ε > 0 and independent of G
if ε = 0. As G does not aﬀect educational decisions under autarky (Proposition 2),
education policy aﬀects ¯ A only when there is a direct link of S to the evolution of TFP
(i.e., when ε > 0). In contrast, under openness, higher education expenditures foster
TFP regardless of ε, because an increase in G attracts capital and thereby raises the
incentives to become skilled. Consequently, under openness, if β ≤ 1/2, ¯ A is increasing
in G.
What is the impact of CMI on steady state TFP level and TFP growth rate (when
β ≤ 1/2)? Suppose that CMI takes place in period ˆ t and individuals adjust their
education decision already in ˆ t−1. If ¯ r = rAUT(Aˆ t, ¯ K,G), the share of skilled workers,
sˆ t, is unchanged for any given TFP level (Proposition 1); therefore curve f(st,G,At) in
Fig. 1 is unchanged by integration in this case. This implies that both the steady state
TFP level, ¯ A, and the TFP growth process remain unaﬀected, i.e., with or without
CMI growth slows down over time as TFP converges to ¯ A.17 If ¯ r < rAUT(Aˆ t, ¯ K,G),
however, then, according to Proposition 1, sˆ t rises in reaction to capital inﬂows. This
shifts the curve f(st,G,At) upward after CMI in ˆ t, as indicated by the dashed curve in
Fig. 1. This raises TFP growth in the subsequent period. Later on, eﬀects of CMI on
the TFP growth rate are unclear, because the speed of convergence increases after CMI.
But clearly, ¯ A rises in response to CMI in this case. Finally, if ¯ r > rAUT(Aˆ t, ¯ K,G),
then ¯ A declines and TFP growth slows down in response to CMI in period ˆ t because
sˆ t decreases.
So far we have focussed on TFP rather than on GDP per worker, Yt. For analyzing
GDP, we ﬁrst rewrite (12) in the form bKβ +(1 − b)(1−s)β = κs(1−s)−(2−β), where
κ ≡ β (1 − b)/(1 − β). Substituting this into (1) and using Lt = 1 − st, St = Gt−1, we
16In fact, also for β > 1/2 TFP can evolve like in Fig. 1. β ≤ 1/2 is suﬃcient but not necessary for
the results in this section.




(1 − st)2−β (Gt−1)
1−β . (19)
Hence, when Gt−1 = G, the steady state level of GDP is given by ¯ Y = κ ¯ A¯ s(1 −
¯ s)−(2−β)G1−β, where ¯ s = s( ¯ K) under autarky and ¯ s = sSOE( ¯ A, ¯ r,G) under capital
mobility. Consequently, ¯ Y increases in G under both autarky or openness.18 Thus,
with respect to steady state levels, the only qualitative diﬀerence between the results
for ¯ Y and ¯ A is that ¯ Y is increasing in G also if ε = 0, as S = G enters the production
function directly.
If education spending does not change over time, the GDP growth rate, gY
t+1 =







st/(1 − st)2−β − 1, (20)
according to (19). Under autarky, where st = s( ¯ K) for all t, (20) implies gY
t+1 = gA
t+1.
Thus, the result of Proposition 6 on gA
t+1 one to one carries over to GDP growth. For
given education spending, gY
t+1 is decreasing over time in autarky. Under openness,
the situation is more complicated since st = sSOE (At, ¯ r,G) changes with productivity
growth. We were not able to derive analytically a suﬃcient condition for convergence
of gY
t with a general economic interpretation. So we checked convergence numerically.
Fig. 2 illustrates, for two diﬀerent values of γ (denoting the elasticity of TFP with
respect to s), the evolution of lnYt, together with the evolution of lnAt and st. It shows
the slowdown of TFP growth rate gA
t+1 as well as a slowdown of GDP growth over time.
It is interesting to note from Fig. 2 that the share of skilled labor st converges rather
quickly along with TFP and GDP.
The following proposition establishes that, qualitatively, the results regarding the
impact of CMI on TFP variables carry over to GDP variables.
18For the case of an open capital market regime, recall that ¯ Y exists if β ≤ 1/2 and that sSOE is
increasing in G, according to Proposition 2.
20Figure 2: Numerical illustrations of growth and participation in higher education in the open 
economy ( 0.1 Gr == ,  0.5 b β ε === ). 
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21Proposition 7. Suppose that capital markets become integrated in period ˆ t and
GDP growth rate gY
t+1 declines over time for a given capital market regime. If ¯ r =
rAUT(Aˆ t, ¯ K,G), then both the steady state GDP level, ¯ Y , and the GDP growth process
remain unaﬀected by CMI. If ¯ r < rAUT(Aˆ t, ¯ K,G), then both ¯ Y and gY
ˆ t+1 rise in re-
sponse to CMI. If ¯ r > rAUT(Aˆ t, ¯ K,G), then both ¯ Y and gY
ˆ t+1 decline in response to
CMI.
Together, CMI eﬀects and convergence properties imply that technological progress
and GDP growth are lower after integration (than before) in economies with capital
outﬂows. If CMI leads to capital inﬂows, integration and convergence eﬀects work
in opposite directions. Since GDP growth slows down during the transition to the
steady state when all other things remain equal, even capital-importing economies
may see a decline in GDP growth when some time has passed after integration. But
this is an implication of convergence properties rather than the impact of integration.
The immediate growth eﬀect of CMI is positive in these economies, as technological
progress is unambiguously spurred. The reason is that educational attainment increases
in economies which attract capital when capital markets integrate.
Before turning to the empirical test of our theoretical results, we want to point to
a novel channel regarding the link between inequality of labor earnings, technological
change and growth. According to our analysis, integration either aﬀects both inequal-
ity and TFP positively or both negatively, i.e., there is always a positive relationship
between inequality and technological change. The mechanism behind this relation-
ship is very diﬀerent to those suggested by the literature on skill-biased technological
change.19 In our model, the direct impact of technological change is neutral, but there
are indirect eﬀects from capital mobility. Capital inﬂows aﬀect the economy like skill-
19For an excellent review of this literature, see Acemoglu (2002). The hypothesis on skill-biased
technological change has been primarily motivated by the observation that an increase in the supply
of skilled labor and rising skill diﬀerentials evolved in parallel in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in
the US and the UK. Our analysis suggests that also increased international capital ﬂows can account
for this pattern, especially when allowing for changes in (optimal) public education expenditure as
response to CMI. The US has experienced large capital inﬂows especially in the 1990s. This may be
part of the reason why earnings inequality appears to have increased so much more than in Continental
Europe. The causes of this pattern are still under debate (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2002) and our model
may prove useful to contribute to it in future research.
22biased technological change does, whereas capital outﬂows are like low-skilled-biased
technological change. Moreover, integration aﬀects participation in higher education,
which has feedback eﬀects on both inequality and technological progress.
6 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical analysis suggests a set of testable hypotheses that can be summarized
in the following way:
1. Net capital inﬂows (outﬂows) induce an increase (a decline) in participation rates
for higher education at a given level of public education expenditures (Proposi-
tion 1). In the empirical implementation, we employ logarithm of inﬂows minus
logarithm of outﬂows as a measure of net capital ﬂows. This variable is used
as one determinant to explain participation in higher schooling. Under the null
hypothesis, net capital inﬂows exhibit a non-positive impact on higher schooling.
The corresponding alternative hypothesis is referred to as Ha
1.
2. A reduction in investment barriers (leading to lower capital cost) and an in-
crease in public education expenditure stimulate participation in higher education
through higher capital inﬂows (Proposition 2). Moreover, changes in investment
barriers induce adjustments of public education expenditure (Propositions 4 and
5). We refer to this hypothesis as Hb
1. Under the corresponding null hypothesis,
a reduction in investment barriers and an increase in endogenous public educa-
tion expenditure exhibit a non-positive impact on a country’s higher schooling
through capital inﬂows.
3. Net capital inﬂows induce an increase in the growth of GDP per worker through
their positive eﬀect on participation in higher education, given the domestic cap-
ital stock and initial GDP (Proposition 7). We will test the corresponding null
hypothesis of a non-positive impact of endogenous higher education on the growth
of GDP per worker against its alternative hypothesis Hc
1.
23For empirical inference, we ﬁrst specify the average annual change of a country’s
higher schooling as a function of net capital inﬂows (Ha
1) and other controls, and then as
one of a reduction in investment barriers and changes in endogenous public education
expenditures (working through capital inﬂows - Hb
1) as well as other controls. We
think of capital ﬂows as ones of production capital and therefore use ﬂows of direct
foreign investment rather than portfolio investment. Finally, we run regressions of
growth in GDP per worker on the change in higher schooling (Hc
1) among other controls
such as the initial level of GDP per worker.20 Thereby, we treat ﬁrst the change in
higher schooling (reﬂecting Ha
1) and then also the net capital inﬂows (reﬂecting Hb
1) as
endogenous. In doing so, we use those explanatory variables of higher schooling (Ha
1
and Hb
1) as instruments, which do not directly aﬀect growth in GDP per worker. We
also account for the endogeneity of public education expenditure.
For the higher schooling variable in the empirical models, we rely on data that are
provided in the updated dataset by Barro and Lee (2000). This dataset covers the time
span 1960-2000. Speciﬁcally, we use the years of schooling for higher (post-secondary)
education in the total population as a measure of higher schooling. As we show in a
sensitivity analysis, our results are qualitatively independent of which measure of higher
schooling is employed.21 From the Penn World Table, we use data on the initial level
and average annual growth of real GDP per worker (U.S. dollars in 1996 constant prices,
chain series), the initial level and average annual growth of the number of workers,
and the initial level of real domestic investment (U.S. dollars in 1996 constant prices,
chain series) per worker as a proxy for capital stocks.22 Data on the level and change
in the share of public education spending are taken from the World Bank’s World
20The initial level of higher schooling as well as primary schooling variables enter the regressions as
determinants for capital ﬂows and the change in higher schooling.
21Alternative measures would be enrollment rates in higher education or the share of population
which completed higher education. According to the theoretical model, both measures are the same.
In reality however, they may diﬀer and time spent in the education system matters for skill acquisition.
Therefore, we think that years of higher schooling are an adequate measure for participation in higher
education. In the sensitivity analysis, we consider alternative higher education variables.
22The chain series approach avoids the potential bias of real growth ﬁgures associated with ﬁxed-
weighted approaches such as the Laspeyres or the Paasche index formulas applied to long time spans.
With chain series, the base year changes periodically.
24Development Indicators. To construct the net capital ﬂow variable, we use information
on outward and inward foreign direct investment from the World Investment Report
(2002, and earlier years). Finally, we employ data on investment barriers from the
Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) to measure the change in investment
cost over time.23 All change variables reﬂect average annual growth rates. In the
Appendix, we give a list of the covered countries. Also, an overview of the descriptive
statistics for the data in use is given there.
Table 2 summarizes our ﬁndings with respect to the ﬁrst and the second alternative
hypothesis: the positive impact of an increase in net inward investment on higher
schooling (Ha
1), and the positive impact of a reduction in investment barriers and
(endogenous) public education spending (Hb
1).
The results from three regressions are reported.24 In Model (1), we include both
the change in net capital inﬂows and the change in public expenditure on education.
To account for size eﬀects in education expenditure and capital inﬂows, we include
the change in the number of workers as a separate explanatory variable. In addition,
we control for the initial levels of public education expenditure, GDP per worker,
and the number of workers. They are included to estimate the net impact of the
direct determinants (changes in international capital ﬂows and adjustments in public
education expenditure) on higher schooling. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of
both the change in net capital inﬂows and that in public education expenditure on
higher schooling. However, our theoretical analysis suggests that the impact of public
education expenditure works primarily through net capital inﬂows.
To cope with this, we treat net capital inﬂows as an endogenous variable in Model
(2) and estimate the parameters by two-stage least-squares (IV-2SLS), using the fol-
lowing identifying instruments:25 the change in public education expenditure, both the
23This measure is also used by Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003) and Blonigen, Davies, Waddell
and Naughton (2004), who are interested in the FDI decisions of multinational ﬁrms.
24Our theoretical model puts forward hypotheses related to higher schooling. From an alternative
set of regressions based on primary schooling (not reported for the sake of brevity) we know that the
same determinants aﬀect primary schooling very diﬀerently from higher schooling. The results are
available from the authors upon request.
25In the ﬁrst-stage regression, net capital inﬂows are projected on the full set of exogenous variables.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26initial level and the change in primary schooling, the initial level in higher schooling, the
initial level of net capital inﬂows, and the reduction in investment barriers.26 Changes
in public education expenditure aﬀect the marginal productivity of capital and thus the
demand for capital. A reduction in investment barriers leads to lower capital cost and
should therefore stimulate net foreign investment. Initial education levels are used as
instruments to capture the fact that whether CMI leads to an inﬂow or outﬂow of cap-
ital depends on the economy’s marginal productivity of capital under autarky, which
is positively related to the autarky education level (due to capital-skill complementar-
ity). As indicated by the p-value of the Hausman-Wu test, the null hypothesis of the
exogeneity of net capital inﬂows is rejected at 5 percent, given the chosen speciﬁcation.
According to the p-values of the tests on instrument relevance and adequacy (over-
identiﬁcation), the choice of instruments seems appropriate from an econometric point
of view. We ﬁnd that an increase in net capital inﬂows is signiﬁcantly positively related
to higher schooling as predicted by Proposition 1. The coeﬃcient of net capital inﬂows
is now signiﬁcant at 5 percent and much higher than in Model (1). According to the
parameter estimates and the descriptive statistics reported in Table 6 in the Appendix,
net capital inﬂows induce a change in higher schooling of 0.0005 ∗ 1.3329 = 0.0007 or
about one tenth of the average change in higher schooling (which is 0.0077). Further-
more, as predicted by Proposition 2, the reduction in investment barriers and changes
in public education spending primarily work through adjustments in net capital ﬂows.27
In Model (3), we investigate the role of endogenous public education expenditure.
To reduce the potential eﬃciency loss from weak instruments, we specify an alternative
IV-2SLS approach and employ net capital inﬂows in a reduced form, there. In this
model, we use the following set of identifying instruments: both the initial level and
the change in primary schooling, the initial level in higher schooling, and the initial
in higher schooling directly, plus the identifying instruments of net capital inﬂows that inﬂuence the
change in higher schooling only indirectly.
26The observations of eight countries are lost from Model (2) onwards due to lacking data on
investment barriers. These countries are Benin, Central African Republic, Dominican Republic, Fiji,
Lesotho, Mauritius, Nepal, and Rwanda.
27The instruments pass the overidentiﬁcation test, indicating that they do not have an additional
direct eﬀect on the change in higher schooling years beyond their impact working through changes in
net capital inﬂows.
27level of net capital inﬂows. Again, the choice of instruments seems appropriate from
an econometric point of view and the exogeneity of public education expenditures is
signiﬁcantly rejected, according to the p-value of the Hausman-Wu test. This conﬁrms
Propositions 4 and 5. Note that both the reduction in investment barriers and the
growth of public education expenditure exert a signiﬁcant positive impact on higher
schooling once they replace net capital inﬂows in a reduced form. Hence, we may
conclude that these determinants aﬀect higher schooling primarily through the channel
of net capital inﬂows, as hypothesized in the theoretical model (Proposition 2).
Table 3 assesses the question how net capital inﬂows aﬀect growth of real GDP per
worker through a change in higher schooling (Hc
1). In the treatment of the endogenous
change in higher schooling, we account for Ha
1 and Hb
1 − conﬁrmed in Table 2. The
initial level of higher schooling is not included as a separate explanatory variable in the
growth of GDP per worker Models (4)-(6). Rather, we use the initial level of higher
schooling − like initial levels of education spending and primary schooling − as an
explanatory variable of the change in higher schooling and the change in net capital
inﬂows. This points to a speciﬁc channel through which the initial level of higher
schooling can work.28
In Model (4), we run a two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression (IV-
2SLS). The corresponding ﬁrst-stage model regresses the change in higher schooling on
all identifying instruments plus the explanatory variables in the second-stage model.
Hence, for inference of the impact of an identifying instrument on an endogenous
variable, we always have to condition on the explanatory variables in the second-
stage regression. Alternatively, we run three-stage least squares system regressions
(SYS-3SLS). First of all, a SYS-3SLS approach allows us to treat net capital ﬂows
and public education expenditures as two endogenous variables that are explained
28In a robustness analysis, we have included the initial level of higher schooling as a separate control
variable in the growth of GDP per worker regressions. However, a signiﬁcant additional eﬀect of this
variable could not be identiﬁed, when controlling for the change in higher years of schooling, the initial
level of the capital stock per worker, and the initial level of real GDP per worker. Therefore, we have




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29by diﬀering sets of explanatory variables.29 Hence, we can account for the economic
mechanisms identiﬁed in the theoretical model more adequately. For instance, we can
exclude direct determinants of the growth in GDP per worker equation from the growth
in higher schooling equation, if they are irrelevant in the latter equation. Second,
we can allow endogenous variables to exert an impact on each other in a way that
lies beyond the possibilities of IV-2SLS.30 Third, SYS-3SLS is eﬃcient and, in small
samples, it can obtain parameter estimates that are (slightly) diﬀerent from their IV-
2SLS counterparts. The precision of the estimates is improved as indicated by the
root mean squared error in each equation (e.g., that one for the growth in GDP per
worker).31
The speciﬁcations of the underlying ﬁrst-stage regression of the IV-2SLS Model (4)
are summarized in the footnote at the bottom of the table. Similarly, we report details
on the speciﬁcations of the SYS-3SLS Models (5) and (6), there. In all models, the
change in higher schooling is treated as an endogenous variable. According to Ha
1,
higher schooling depends on net capital inﬂows which in turn depend on investment
barriers and endogenous public education expenditure, according to Hb
1. In Model
(4), we apply a reduced form approach with respect to endogenous net capital inﬂows
and endogenous public education expenditure. Hence, the determinants (identifying
instruments) of the latter two variables are used as instruments in the higher schooling
ﬁrst-stage regression. In particular, the reduction in investment barriers is included to
account for Hb
1. In the system regression models (5) and (6), we do not run the full
system of structural equations. It turns out that treating the growth rates of GDP
per worker, higher schooling, education expenditures, and net capital inﬂows jointly as
endogenous in a system of equations and accounting for their interdependence exceeds
29Note that this is not the case with an IV-2SLS approach, where all endogenous variables are
projected on the same set of instruments.
30For instance, in a system of three equations, we may allow endogenous public education expendi-
ture to co-determine higher schooling, with the latter aﬀecting GDP per capita growth.
31Note that the R2-values of IV-2SLS and SYS-3SLS are diﬃcult to compare. Therefore, the
respective values are not displayed in Table 3. What matters is the comparison of standardized
statistics such as the relevance of identifying variables. Also, standardized estimates such as the root
mean squared errors of the equations are comparable across speciﬁcations. These are summarized in
the table.
30the possibilities in this dataset. It seems preferable to replace at least one of these
endogenous variables by its reduced form (see the table for details). Accordingly, the
results of Models (5) and (6) are based on a system of three rather than four equations.
In both SYS-3SLS models, we treat the growth rate of GDP per worker and that of
higher schooling as two structural equations. Model (5) speciﬁes the change in net
capital inﬂows in a structural way. The model accounts for the dependence of higher
schooling on capital ﬂows which in turn depend on investment barriers. Endogenous
adjustments in public education expenditure are employed in a reduced form. Similar
to Model (4), Model (5) does not account for a direct impact of education spending on
the growth of GDP per worker, as the change in education spending is replaced by its
explanatory variables in the respective reduced form approach. In comparison to this,
Model (6) uses a reduced form for net capital ﬂows and introduces a separate equation
for the change in public education expenditure, instead. In particular, we account for
the possibility that public education expenditure is adjusted in response to changes
in investment barriers. Changes in public education expenditure are allowed to aﬀect
growth directly or through changes in the higher schooling variable.
As expected from the large body of research on Barro-type convergence regressions,
we identify a signiﬁcant negative impact of initial real GDP per worker on its growth
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, for an overview). The initial level of capital stock
per capita is positively related to growth of GDP per worker. The average annual
change in the number of workers exhibits a signiﬁcantly negative impact in Model
(6) but turns out to be insigniﬁcant in Models (4) and (5). Most importantly, the
growth in GDP per worker is signiﬁcantly positively related to the change in higher
schooling throughout. The treatment of higher schooling as an endogenous variable
and the underlying choice of instruments (explanatory variables) is justiﬁed from an
econometric point of view.32 Thus, the results also conﬁrm the hypothesis that an
increase in net capital ﬂows in response to reduced investment barriers fosters economic
32The instruments are relevant and adequate in the ﬁrst-stage of Model (4). They pass the Hansen
J-test on over-identifying restrictions, indicating that the instruments need not be included in the
second-stage model. Similarly, the explanatory variables are highly relevant in all equations of the
SYS-3SLS models.
31growth through increased participation in higher schooling.
It is worth noting that accounting for endogeneity matters in general. To see
this, we also estimated an alternative model, where the average annual change in
higher schooling was treated as exogenous (not reported for the sake of brevity). By
disregarding the endogeneity of this variable, the corresponding parameter estimate is
severely downward biased, amounting to only 0.982. Also, based on a Hausman-Wu
test in Model (4), we would conclude that the average annual change in higher schooling
should not be treated as exogenous, given the chosen speciﬁcation (the corresponding
test statistic is signiﬁcant at 1 percent throughout). According to Model (6), there
is a direct impact of education expenditures on the growth of GDP per worker, in
addition to the eﬀects on participation in higher schooling. This is well in line with
our theoretical analysis in section 5.
Our results on (i) the impact of net capital inﬂows on participation in higher ed-
ucation and (ii) the impact of the latter on the growth in real GDP per worker are
very robust with respect to the use of alternative schooling measures. This conclusion
is based on the results summarized in Tables 4 and 5. Whereas the results in Table
4 should be compared to Model (2) in Table 2, those in Table 5 refer to the ones of
Model (5) in Table 3. Hence, all of the results in Table 4 are based in IV-2SLS and
those in Table 5 are based on SYS-3SLS estimation.
In Models (2.1) and (5.1), we use higher schooling years of males rather than that
of the total population, being identical to Models (2) and (5), respectively, in all
other respects. This is to account for the fact that labor market participation of
females varies considerably across diﬀerent societies. The results are very similar to
the original ones in qualitative terms. In Models (2.2) and (5.2), the secondary years
of schooling serve as higher schooling measure. Again, the results are quite similar
to those of our baseline regressions, with the main diﬀerence that the coeﬃcient of
the net capital inﬂow variable is smaller and insigniﬁcant in Model (2.2).33 Finally,
in Models (2.3) and (5.3) we rely on the percentage of higher schooling attained (i.e.,
33This indicates that secondary schooling is too broad a concept for the higher education issues



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34the share of population that has acquired higher education) rather than the years
of higher schooling. Since the units of measurement are diﬀerent as compared to
the originally employed higher schooling variable, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients
is not directly comparable to Models (2) and (5), respectively. However, the results
are qualitatively similar across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Overall, our ﬁnding of a
(signiﬁcantly) positive impact of (endogenous) net capital inﬂows on participation in
higher schooling and of (endogenous) higher schooling on the growth of GDP per worker
are robust with respect to the choice of the schooling measure employed.34
7 Conclusion
This research has been motivated by the strongly increasing international capital ﬂows
in the last decades, the apparent complementarity between skilled labor and physical
capital, and the evidence on human capital as a factor of economic growth. We have
presented theory and evidence on the impact of CMI on participation in higher educa-
tion and on economic growth. We have shown that when public education expenditure
is held constant, integration leads to an increase in the share of high-skilled labor, in-
equality and growth in capital-importing economies, whereas the opposite occurs when
CMI leads to capital outﬂows. If we allow for optimal adjustment of public education
expenditure, CMI tends to raise participation in higher education, provided induced
capital-exports are not too large.
Our empirical analysis largely conﬁrms the main hypotheses derived in this paper:
First, net capital inﬂows − whether or not they are treated as endogenous − signif-
icantly aﬀect participation in higher schooling, irrespective of the measure of higher
education. Second, changes in investment barriers and endogenous public education
spending are important determinants of net capital ﬂows and therby aﬀect partici-
pation in higher education. Third, capital ﬂows signiﬁcantly aﬀect economic growth
34In a further sensitivity analysis, we ran Models (2) and (5) on two time subsamples of our data:
1960-1985 and 1985-2000. The results are qualitatively unchanged, with the eﬀects of interest − the
impact of net capital inﬂows on participation in higher education and the impact of participation in
higher education on growth − being stronger in the later period.
35through their eﬀect on higher education.
8 Appendix
8.1 Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Use (12) together with the facts that K = ¯ K under autarky
and K = KSOE = ξ(A, ¯ r)G in a small open economy. 
Proof of Proposition 3. First, note that VGA > 0 and VGG < 0, according to
(16). GAUT is given by ﬁrst-order condition VG(A,s( ¯ K),GAUT) = 0. (Subscripts of V
denote partial derivatives.) Thus, ∂GAUT/∂A = −VGA/VGG > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 1. First, substituting K = ξ(A, ¯ r)G in (12) we see that G and






2−β + (1 − b)(1 − s)
2
− β (1 − b)s = 0. (A.1)
Since the left-hand side of (A.1) is increasing in G and decreasing in s, equation (A.1)
deﬁnes a monotonically increasing one-to-one relationship between G and sSOE. We











and limG→∞ sSOE (A, ¯ r,G) = 1.














≡ ˆ G(A, ¯ r,s) (A.3)
with lims→s ˆ G(A, ¯ r,s) = 0 and lims→1 ˆ G(a, ¯ r,s) = ∞. (Note that βs/(1 − β) >
(=)(1 − s)
2 if s > (=, resp.) s.) ˆ G(a, ¯ r,·) is the inverse of sSOE (A, ¯ r,·).
36Now let us deﬁne ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s) ≡ V (A,s, ˆ G(A, ¯ r,s)). Since, for s ∈ (s,1), sSOE

A, ¯ r, ˆ G(A, ¯ r,s)











A, ¯ r, ˆ G(A, ¯ r,s)

.
Therefore, ˜ s ∈ (s,1) is a maximizer of ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s) if and only if ˆ G(A, ¯ r, ˜ s) ∈ (0,∞) is a
maximizer of ˜ V (A, ¯ r,G). (Recall that ˆ Gs > 0.)
We proceed with the proof by the following two steps. In step 1, we show that
there exists a ˜ s ∈ (s,1) which is a local maximizer of ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s) if A < ˆ A. In step 2, we
show that ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s) has a unique local extremum, so that ˜ s is the unique and global
maximizer of ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s). We therefore know that ˜ V (A, ¯ r,G) has a unique maximum at
ˆ G(A, ¯ r, ˜ s) ∈ (0,∞).35
Step 1: Substituting (A.3) into (16) and rearranging terms gives us





















(1 − β)(1 − s)2 − 1. (A.5)
Note that B > 0 if s > s, according to (A.2). We show that for A < ˆ A there
exists ˜ s ∈ (s,1) which is a local maximizer of ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s) by conﬁrming the following
three properties: (i) ˆ Vs(A, ¯ r,s) is continuous in s for s ∈ (s,1), (ii) ˆ Vs(A, ¯ r,s) > 0 if
s ∈ (s,1) is suﬃciently close to s and (iii) ˆ Vs(A, ¯ r,s) < 0 if A < ˆ A and s ∈ (s,1)
is suﬃciently close to 1. Using (A.4) and (A.5), it is tedious but straightforward to





s)/[ξ(A, ¯ r)(1 − s)], with q(A, ¯ r,s) > 0 for s ∈ (s,1), and
Q(A, ¯ r,s) ≡
β(1 − β)bAξ(A, ¯ r)β
βs − (1 − β)(1 − s)2 −
(1 − β)(1 − s + s2) + (1 − s)2
(1 − β)(1 − s + s2)2 . (A.6)
Recall that βs−(1−β)(1−s)2 > 0 if s > s, approaching zero when s diminishes towards
s. Properties (i) and (ii) then immediately follow. To see property (iii), substitute ξ
35Employing function ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s) to prove Lemma 1, rather than employing ˜ V (A, ¯ r,G), turns out
to be more tractable. Moreover, the derivations in this proof will be useful to prove our subsequent
results in a shorter and more elegant way.
37from (14) into (A.6) to ﬁnd that Q(A, ¯ r,1) < 0 if and only if A < ˆ A, with ˆ A as deﬁned
in Lemma 1. This concludes step 1.
Step 2: For step 2, ﬁrst rewrite the expression for ˆ Vs to ˆ Vs(A, ¯ r,s) = z(A, ¯ r,s)Z(A, ¯ r,s),
where
z(A, ¯ r,s) ≡
q(A, ¯ r,s)
βs − (1 − β)(1 − s)2, (A.7)
with z(A, ¯ r,s) > 0 for s ∈ (s,1), and
Z(A, ¯ r,s) ≡ β(1 − β)bAξ(A, ¯ r)
β − β +

2(1 − s)2
1 − s + s2 −
s(1 − s)2






(1 − s)(1 + s)
(1 − s + s2)









Since Φs(s,β) < 0 for s < 1, we have: If β ≤ 0.5, then Φ(s,β) > 0 and therefore
Zs < 0 for all s < 1. If β > 0.5, then there exists a critical value sc(β) deﬁned by
Φ(s,β) = 0 such that Zs < 0 for s < sc(β) and Zs > 0 for s > sc(β). Noting that
ˆ Vss(A, ¯ r, ˜ s) = z(A, ¯ r, ˜ s)Zs(A, ¯ r, ˜ s) whenever ˆ Vs (A, ¯ r, ˜ s) = 0 and recalling the fact that
z(A, ¯ r,s) > 0 for s ∈ (s,1), we conclude that any local extremum ˜ s ∈ (s,1) of ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s)
is a local maximum if β ≤ 0.5. For the case β > 0.5, suppose there exists a ˜ s ∈ (s,1)
which is a local minimizer of ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s). For this, a necessary condition is ˜ s > sc(β).
However, property (iii) in step 1 says that ˆ Vs(A, ¯ r,s) < 0 if A < ˆ A and s ∈ (s,1) is
suﬃciently close to 1. Hence, ˜ s can only be a local minimizer if there exists a local
maximizer ˇ s > ˜ s > sc(β). But this is a contradiction since Zs(A, ¯ r,s) > 0 for s > sc(β).
Hence, we can conclude that also in the case β > 0.5 any local extremum ˜ s ∈ (s,1) of
ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s) is a local maximum. Combining this with step 1, we have: ˆ V (A, ¯ r,s) has a
unique local (and thus global) maximum in s if A < ˆ A. 
Proof of Proposition 4. GSOE satisﬁes ﬁrst-order condition ˜ VG(A, ¯ r,G) = 0, i.e.,




38GAUT is given by VG(A,sAUT,GAUT) = 0. If ¯ r = rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT), then sSOE = sAUT.
Thus, at G = GAUT, the ﬁrst term of the left-hand side of (A.10) vanishes, whereas
the second term is strictly positive (Vs > 0 and ∂sSOE/∂G > 0, according to (16) and
Proposition 2, respectively). ˜ VG (A, ¯ r,GAUT) > 0 implies GSOE > GAUT. 
Proof of Proposition 5. In the proof of Lemma 1, we have shown that there ex-
ists a unique s∗ (A, ¯ r) ∈ (s,1) solving ˆ Vs(A, ¯ r,s∗) = 0. Moreover, ˆ Vss(A, ¯ r,s∗) < 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain ∂s∗/∂A > 0 and ∂s∗/∂¯ r < 0
from (A.7), (A.8) and (14). According to Proposition 4, GSOE > GAUT if ¯ r =
rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT) and sSOE(A, ¯ r,GAUT) = sAUT. Hence, in this case, s∗(A, ¯ r) =
sSOE(A, ¯ r,GSOE) > sAUT. (Note ∂sSOE/∂G > 0.) ∂s∗/∂¯ r < 0 implies s∗(A, ¯ r) > sAUT
if ¯ r < rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT), but if ¯ r > rAUT(A, ¯ K,GAUT), s∗ (A, ¯ r) may drop below sAUT.

Proof of Proposition 6. From (18), both parts of Proposition 6 are easy to
conﬁrm in the autarky case, using st = s( ¯ K) for all t and γ ∈ (0,1). To prove part
(i) under capital mobility, we need to show that the following three properties hold
when β ≤ 1/2. First, ˜ f(A, ¯ r,G) ≡ f(sSOE(A, ¯ r,G),G,A) is an increasing and strictly
concave function of A, second, limA→0 ˜ fA(A, ¯ r,G) > 1, and third, limA→∞ ˜ fA(A, ¯ r,G) <
1. (Note that f (0, ¯ r,G) = 0.) A suﬃcient condition for ˜ f(A, ¯ r,G) to be increasing and
strictly concave as function of A is that sSOE(A,·) is increasing and concave as function






2−β + (1 − s)
2
i
− βs = 0, (A.11)



















implying that ˜ f(A, ¯ r,G) is increasing in A. It is straightforward to show that the right-
hand side of (A.12) is decreasing in s. Furthermore, it declines in A if β ≤ 1/2. Thus,
39β ≤ 1/2 is suﬃcient for ∂2sSOE/∂A2 < 0, which conﬁrms that ˜ f(A, ¯ r,G) is strictly
concave as function of A. Next, we diﬀerentiate ˜ f(A, ¯ r,G) with respect to A. From
(18), we get



























+ (1 − γ)sSOE

 + 1 − δ,
where the latter equation follows from substituting (A.12) and rearranging terms. Us-
ing limA→0 sSOE = s, we obtain limA→0 ˜ fA(A, ¯ r,G) = ∞ . Finally, using limA→∞ sSOE =
1, we ﬁnd limA→∞ ˜ fA(A, ¯ r,G) = 1 − δ. This conﬁrms part (i) for the open economy.
It remains to prove part (ii) under capital mobility. Diﬀerentiating ˜ g(sSOE,S,A) =
(sSOE/A)



















Since sSOE is positive, increasing and, if β ≤ 1/2, strictly concave in A, we have
∂sSOE/∂A < sSOE/A and thus ∂˜ g/∂A < 0 if β ≤ 1/2. Therefore, as we know that




Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
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Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, RB Venezuela, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Acemoglu, Daron (2002). Technical Change, Inequality and the Labor Market, Journal
of Economic Literature 35, 7-72.
Alfaro, Laura, Areendam Chanda, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Selin Sayek (2004).
FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets, Journal of Interna-
tional Economics 64, 89-112.
Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2000). International Data on Educational At-
tainment: Updates and Implications, manuscript, Harvard University, February 2000.
Barro, Robert J., N. Gregory Mankiw and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995). Capital
Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth, American Economic Review 85, 103-115.
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995). Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill,
Inc, New York.
Blonigen, Bruce A., Ronald B. Davies and Keith Head (2003). Estimating the
Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Comment, American Eco-
nomic Review 93, 980-994.
Blonigen, Bruce A., Ronald B. Davies, Glen Waddell and Helen Naughton (2004).
FDI in Space: Spatial Autoregressive Relationships in Foreign Direct Investment,
NBER Working Paper No. 10939, Cambridge, MA.
Galor, Oded and Omer Moav (2000). Ability-Biased Technological Transition,
Wage Inequality, and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 469-
97.
Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer
(2004). Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth 9, 271-303.
Glomm, Gerhard and B. Ravikumar (1992). Public versus Private Investment in
Human Capital: Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 100, 818-834.
Goldin Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz (1998). The Origins of Technology-Skill
Complementarity, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 693-732.
Gradstein, Mark and Moshe Justman (1995). Competitive Investment in Higher
43Education: The Need for Policy Coordination, Economics Letters 47, 393-400.
Gradstein, Mark, Moshe Justman and Volker Meier (2005). The Political Economy
of Education. Implications for Growth and Inequality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hojo, Masakazu (2003). An Indirect Eﬀect of Education on Growth, Economics
Letters 80, 31-34.
Khawar, Mariam (2005). Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: A
Cross Country Analysis, Global Economy Journal 5, Article 8, www.bepress.com/gej.
Krusell, Per, Lee E. Ohanian, Jos´ e-V´ ıctor R´ ıos-Rull and Giovanni L. Violante
(2000). Capital-Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis,
Econometrica 68, 1029-1053.
Lucas, Robert E. (1988). On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Journal of
Monetary Economics 22, 3-42.
Lucas, Robert E. (1990). Why doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries,
American Economic Review 80, 92-96.
Markusen, James R. (2002). Multinational Firms and the Theory of International
Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Smulders, Sjak (2004). International Capital Market Integration: Implications for
Convergence, Growth, and Welfare, International Economics and Economic Policy 1,
173-194.
UNCTAD (1996), World Investment Report 1996, United Nations, New York.
UNCTAD (2002), World Investment Report 2002, United Nations, New York.
Viaene, Jean-Marie and Itzhak Zilcha (2002a). Public Education under Capital
Mobility, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26, 2005-2036.
Viaene, Jean-Marie and Itzhak Zilcha (2002b). Capital Markets Integration, Growth
and Income Distribution, European Economic Review 46, 301-327.
44CESifo Working Paper Series 




1565 Joerg Breitung and M. Hashem Pesaran, Unit Roots and Cointegration in Panels, 
October 2005 
 
1566 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Marc Schramm, Putting New Economic 
Geography to the Test: Free-ness of Trade and Agglomeration in the EU Regions, 
October 2005 
 
1567 Robert Haveman, Karen Holden, Barbara Wolfe and Andrei Romanov, Assessing the 
Maintenance of Savings Sufficiency Over the First Decade of Retirement, October 2005 
 
1568 Hans Fehr and Christian Habermann, Risk Sharing and Efficiency Implications of 
Progressive Pension Arrangements, October 2005 
 
1569 Jovan Žamac, Pension Design when Fertility Fluctuates: The Role of Capital Mobility 
and Education Financing, October 2005 
 
1570 Piotr Wdowinski and Aneta Zglinska-Pietrzak, The Warsaw Stock Exchange Index 
WIG: Modelling and Forecasting, October 2005 
 
1571 J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz, Vincenzo Galasso and Paola Profeta, Early Retirement and 
Social Security: A Long Term Perspective, October 2005 
 
1572 Johannes Binswanger, Risk Management of Pension Systems from the Perspective of 
Loss Aversion, October 2005 
 
1573 Geir B. Asheim, Wolfgang Buchholz, John M. Hartwick, Tapan Mitra and Cees 
Withagen, Constant Savings Rates and Quasi-Arithmetic Population Growth under 
Exhaustible Resource Constraints, October 2005 
 
1574 Christian Hagist, Norbert Klusen, Andreas Plate and Bernd Raffelhueschen, Social 
Health Insurance – the Major Driver of Unsustainable Fiscal Policy?, October 2005 
 
1575 Roland Hodler and Kurt Schmidheiny, How Fiscal Decentralization Flattens 
Progressive Taxes, October 2005 
 
1576 George W. Evans, Seppo Honkapohja and Noah Williams, Generalized Stochastic 
Gradient Learning, October 2005 
 
1577 Torben M. Andersen, Social Security and Longevity, October 2005 
 
1578 Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas, The Market for Protection and the Origin of the 
State, October 2005 
 
1579 Jan K. Brueckner and Stuart S. Rosenthal, Gentrification and Neighborhood Housing 
Cycles: Will America’s Future Downtowns be Rich?, October 2005  
1580 Elke J. Jahn and Wolfgang Ochel, Contracting Out Temporary Help Services in 
Germany, November 2005 
 
1581 Astri Muren and Sten Nyberg, Young Liberals and Old Conservatives – Inequality, 
Mobility and Redistribution, November 2005 
 
1582 Volker Nitsch, State Visits and International Trade, November 2005 
 
1583 Alessandra Casella, Thomas Palfrey and Raymond Riezman, Minorities and Storable 
Votes, November 2005 
 
1584 Sascha O. Becker, Introducing Time-to-Educate in a Job Search Model, November 2005 
 
1585 Christos Kotsogiannis and Robert Schwager, On the Incentives to Experiment in 
Federations, November 2005 
 
1586 Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Guttorm Schjelderup, Centralized 
vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes, November 2005 
 
1587 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Barry Williams, What Determines Differences in Foreign Bank 
Efficiency? Australian Evidence, November 2005 
 
1588 Steven Brakman and Charles van Marrewijk, Transfers, Non-Traded Goods, and 
Unemployment: An Analysis of the Keynes – Ohlin Debate, November 2005 
 
1589 Kazuo Ogawa, Elmer Sterken and Ichiro Tokutsu, Bank Control and the Number of 
Bank Relations of Japanese Firms, November 2005 
 
1590 Bruno Parigi and Loriana Pelizzon, Diversification and Ownership Concentration, 
November 2005 
 
1591 Claude Crampes, Carole Haritchabalet and Bruno Jullien, Advertising, Competition and 
Entry in Media Industries, November 2005 
 
1592 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Optimal Tax Policy when Firms are 
Internationally Mobile, November 2005 
 
1593 Jim Malley, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Ulrich Woitek, Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal 
Policy and Macroeconomic Fluctuations, November 2005 
 
1594 Assar Lindbeck, Sustainable Social Spending, November 2005 
 
1595 Hartmut Egger and Udo Kreickemeier, International Fragmentation: Boon or Bane for 
Domestic Employment?, November 2005 
 
1596 Martin Werding, Survivor Benefits and the Gender Tax Gap in Public Pension 
Schemes: Observations from Germany, November 2005 
 
1597 Petra Geraats, Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice, November 2005 
  
1598 Christian Dustman and Francesca Fabbri, Gender and Ethnicity – Married Immigrants 
in Britain, November 2005 
 
1599 M. Hashem Pesaran and Martin Weale, Survey Expectations, November 2005 
 
1600 Ansgar Belke, Frank Baumgaertner, Friedrich Schneider and Ralph Setzer, The 
Different Extent of Privatisation Proceeds in EU Countries: A Preliminary Explanation 
Using a Public Choice Approach, November 2005 
 
1601 Jan K. Brueckner, Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth, November 2005 
 
1602 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Cross-Border Mergers 
and Acquisitions: On Revealed Comparative Advantage and Merger Waves, November 
2005 
 
1603 Erkki Koskela and Rune Stenbacka, Product Market Competition, Profit Sharing and 
Equilibrium Unemployment, November 2005 
 
1604 Lutz Hendricks, How Important is Discount Rate Heterogeneity for Wealth Inequality?, 
November 2005 
 
1605 Kathleen M. Day and Stanley L. Winer, Policy-induced Internal Migration: An 
Empirical Investigation of the Canadian Case, November 2005 
 
1606 Paul De Grauwe and Cláudia Costa Storti, Is Monetary Policy in the Eurozone less 
Effective than in the US?, November 2005 
 
1607 Per Engström and Bertil Holmlund, Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium, 
November 2005 
 
1608 Daniele Checchi and Cecilia García-Peñalosa, Labour Market Institutions and the 
Personal Distribution of Income in the OECD, November 2005 
 
1609 Kai A. Konrad and Wolfgang Leininger, The Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium of 
the All-Pay Auction with Complete Information, November 2005 
 
1610 Monika Buetler and Federica Teppa, Should you Take a Lump-Sum or Annuitize? 
Results from Swiss Pension Funds, November 2005 
 
1611 Alexander W. Cappelen, Astri D. Hole, Erik Ø. Sørensen and Bertil Tungodden, The 
Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach, December 2005 
 
1612 Jack Mintz and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Taxation and the Financial Structure of 
German Outbound FDI, December 2005 
 
1613 Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the Bottom: 
Host Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies, December 2005 
 
1614 Chi-Yung (Eric) Ng and John Whalley, Visas and Work Permits: Possible Global 
Negotiating Initiatives, December 2005  
1615 Jon H. Fiva, New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government, 
December 2005 
 
1616 Andzelika Lorentowicz, Dalia Marin and Alexander Raubold, Is Human Capital Losing 
from Outsourcing? Evidence for Austria and Poland, December 2005 
 
1617 Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera and Christopher Waller, Money, Credit and 
Banking, December 2005 
 
1618 Egil Matsen, Tommy Sveen and Ragnar Torvik, Savers, Spenders and Fiscal Policy in a 
Small Open Economy, December 2005 
 
1619 Laszlo Goerke and Markus Pannenberg, Severance Pay and the Shadow of the Law: 
Evidence for West Germany, December 2005 
 
1620 Michael Hoel, Concerns for Equity and the Optimal Co-Payments for Publicly Provided 
Health Care, December 2005 
 
1621 Edward Castronova, On the Research Value of Large Games: Natural Experiments in 
Norrath and Camelot, December 2005 
 
1622 Annette Alstadsæter, Ann-Sofie Kolm and Birthe Larsen, Tax Effects, Search 
Unemployment, and the Choice of Educational Type, December 2005 
 
1623 Vesa Kanniainen, Seppo Kari and Jouko Ylä-Liedenpohja, Nordic Dual Income 
Taxation of Entrepreneurs, December 2005 
 
1624 Lars-Erik Borge and Linn Renée Naper, Efficiency Potential and Efficiency Variation in 
Norwegian Lower Secondary Schools, December 2005 
 
1625 Sam Bucovetsky and Andreas Haufler, Tax Competition when Firms Choose their 
Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals be Closed?, December 
2005 
 
1626 Silke Uebelmesser, To go or  not to go: Emigration from Germany, December 2005 
 
1627 Geir Haakon Bjertnæs, Income Taxation, Tuition Subsidies, and Choice of Occupation: 
Implications for Production Efficiency, December 2005 
 
1628 Justina A. V. Fischer, Do Institutions of Direct Democracy Tame the Leviathan? Swiss 
Evidence on the Structure of Expenditure for Public Education, December 2005 
 
1629 Torberg Falch and Bjarne Strøm, Wage Bargaining and Political Strength in the Public 
Sector, December 2005 
 
1630 Hartmut Egger, Peter Egger, Josef Falkinger and Volker Grossmann, International 
Capital Market Integration, Educational Choice and Economic Growth, December 2005 